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Abstract
An emerging view of business cycles from the news-shock literature suggests
that recessions may occur when agents depress their demand for new capital upon
the realization that they have accumulated too much conditional on current infor-
mation. In this paper I use a New Keynesian model with a financial accelerator to
study the behaviour of interest and prices under both a “technology boom-bust”
driven by changes in expectation about TFP, and a “credit boom-bust” driven by
changes in expectations about the efficiency of the financial sector. While the two
scenarios are similar in that they both lead to a run-up and then sharp drop-off in
new capital and debt, I show that the behaviour of interest and prices depends crit-
ically on the nature of the new-shock driving the overaccumulation. In particular,
the boom-phase of the TFP boom-bust is characterized by below-trend inflation or
deflation, whereas that of the credit boom-bust is characterized by above-trend but
low inflation. In contrast, inflation falls below-trend in the bust phases of both.
I show that consistent with results elsewhere in the literature, stricter inflation-
targeting fails to pull the economy toward the efficient equilibrium during the boom
phase of the TFP boom-bust. In contrast, stricter inflation targeting pushes the
economy closer to the flexible-price response during the boom-phase of the credit
boom-bust. In both cases however, conditional on realization of overaccumulation,
inflation-targeting pulls the economy towards the flexible price equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In a typical DSGE model of aggregate fluctuations, recessions are the result of “contrac-
tionary” exogenous shocks to fundamentals, be they technological, financial, monetary
or preference. Understanding the role of policy then in turn involves understanding how
nominal and other variables of policy interest respond to such fundamental shocks for
given policy regimes. Indeed in the wake of the crisis of the Great Recession, the DSGE
literature has been on a sprint to identify which shock(s) drove the economy into re-
cession, and then conditional on this, trying to understand whether policy helped or
hindered the response.
In this paper I investigate the behaviour of interest and prices under an alternative
view of recessions espoused by the news-shock literature related to the overaccumulation
of capital. According to this view, recessions can result simply from agents’ realiza-
tion that they accumulated too much capital during the boom-times of the past under
“overly-optimistic” expectations about the improvement of some fundamental in the fu-
ture1. In contrast to the conventional view, these recessions need not involve any realized
contractionary shocks to fundamentals. Instead, changes in expectations emerge as an
independent driver of aggregate fluctuations. Moreover, the bust is inextricably linked
to the boom by the endogenous accumulation of capital. As a result, understanding pol-
icy during such a boom-bust requires moving beyond simply understanding the impact
on interest and prices of realized shocks to fundamentals that may separately cause a
boom or bust, to understanding how changes in expectations alone impact these nominal
variables over an entire boom-bust cycle.
To study this relation between the nominal side of the economy and the dynamics
of expectations over a boom-bust cycle, I used a relatively standard New Keynesian
model with variable capital and the financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al.
(1999). I then allow for news-shocks about two different types of disturbances - stochastic
1See Beaudry and Portier (2004), Christiano et al. (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Gunn and
Johri (2011) and Dupor and Mehkari (2013) for structural models that explore the imperfect information
feature of news shocks to simulate recessions due to overaccumulation.
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economy-wide TFP and a stochastic economy-wide element in the financial sector - as a
way of investigating how altering the ultimate source of expectations impacts the path
of expectations and thus nominal variable variables over the cycle, and also as a way of
representing “technology” and “credit” as two distinct contexts thought to be a factor
in business cycles in general, and the last two recessions in particular.
While there has been some work done to study the behaviour of interest and prices
under changes in expectations about the future path of total factor productivity (TFP)
such as that in Christiano et al. (2008), Barsky and Sims (2009), Christiano et al. (2011),
Beaudry and Portier (2013b) and Jinnai (2013), there has been little work on understand-
ing their behaviour in overaccumulations due to non-TFP news episodes 2. Moreover even
in real models that abstract from nominal variables and policy, relative to the depth of
the literature for TFP-driven news episodes, that for non-TFP episodes is rather thin3.
Yet allowing for anticipation effects in other stochastic process beyond just TFP-driven
news episodes allows us to think about how overaccumulation could play a role more
generally in recessions where changes in neutral technology appear not to have been a
dominant factor. For example, Gunn and Johri (2013a) show in a real model with flexible
prices how the onset of the Great Recession could have been triggered by the overaccu-
mulation of capital and debt under expectations about innovations in the financial sector
that failed to materialize. Furthermore, studying the impact of both TFP and non-TFP
news on the nominal economy in the same exercise helps isolate relative expected shocks
themselves on these variables, holding constant the structural mechanisms in the model
that catalyze the booms in the response to news.
The stochastic process for TFP enters into the model in a standard way, such that
in the financial accelerator framework a realized shock to TFP increases the demand
for capital by entrepreneurs, but at the same time, shifts out the economy’s resource
constraint through the supply-effects of the shock. To model the stochastic element in the
2See also Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) who study the nominal impact of anticipated shocks to produc-
tivity that shares features with the news-shock literature.
3See Leeper et al. (2012), Guo et al. (2012), Zeev and Khan (2012), Gortz and Tsoukalas (2013),
Gunn and Johri (2013a), Gunn and Johri (2013b) and Christiano et al. (2014) for models with non-TFP
related news.
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financial sector, I include a stochastic element in the financial contract that parameterizes
the monitoring cost as in Gunn and Johri (2013a) and Levin et al. (2004). Under this
framework, a stochastic shock to this process results in a reduction in the cost of default,
leading to an increase in demand for new capital by entrepreneurs for a given risk-free rate
and credit spread. Thus while realized shocks in both the technology and credit episodes
lead to a direct increase in demand for capital, only in the TFP case does the shock
also induce direct supply-side effects. As I will discuss later, this distinction between the
expected effect of the two shock in a news framework has important consequences for the
nominal side of the economy.
I allow for anticipation in both stochastic processes in a standard way as in Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009) and Christiano et al. (2008) such that news shocks in each respective
stochastic process serve as imperfect signals about the future stochastic innovations. In
both the TFP and credit episodes, news about an improvement in the respective stochas-
tic process leads to an expansion of debt and capital in the present in anticipation of the
future. If in the future the news turns out to be ex-post incorrect, agents realize they have
accumulated too much debt and capital, and as a result, depress their demand for new
capital, leading the economy into recession driven by overaccumulation, scenarios that I
refer to as “technology boom-bust” and “credit boom-bust” respectively. Interestingly,
on the real side of the economy, the behaviour of real quantities and relative prices in
both the technology and credit boom-busts is nearly identical: consumption, investment,
hours and output boom in response to good news, asset prices rise, and credit spreads
fall. During the bust phase, the direction of these variables are reversed, although the
recessionary response is much more sudden since the accumulated debt and capital along
with revised expectations reflecting no changes in fundamentals means that entrepreneurs
suddenly find themselves in poor financial health. Yet the behaviour of the nominal side
of the economy in the two episodes diverges: in the technology boom-bust inflation is
below-trend during both the boom and bust, whereas in the credit boom-bust inflation is
above-trend yet low during the boom, and below-trend during the bust. Thus comparing
the ex-post time-series of the two episodes, we see two very similar boom-busts in the
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real economy in the absence of any variation in fundamentals, but a path of policy and
inflation that is very different.
To understand the behaviour of the nominal side of the economy under such an over-
accumulation boom-bust, consider that in a New Keynesian framework with standard
sticky price mechanism such as Calvo-pricing, inflation is a function of current and ex-
pected future marginal costs. The pre-shock boom-phase of such a news-driven cycle
occurs in the absence of shocks to exogenous fundamentals, and is often described as be-
ing akin to a demand-like shock if the change in expectations about the future translates
into an increase in consumption and/or investment demand in the present leading to a
dominant increase in the demand for goods in the present.4 Under a standard sticky-
price framework, on average the production sector meets this change in demand with
increased production in the present, driving up marginal costs in the present and thus
putting upward pressure on inflation. Yet price-setters also look forward to the expected
path of marginal costs beyond the pre-shock boom phase to the period when the shock
is expected to hit. The response of inflation in the present will as a result depend on the
behaviour of marginal costs in both the demand-driven pre-shock boom phase we well
as the shock phase when the exogenous shock to fundamentals is expected to hit. Thus
despite the fact that two distinct news shocks about different stochastic processes might
cause a similar upward pressure on marginal costs in the initial demand-like boom phase
of each respective episode, the response of initial inflation in each case may be different if
the expected impact on marginal costs is different for when each respective shock hits in
the future. As others such as Christiano et al. (2011) and Barsky and Sims (2009) have
noted, shocks to TFP tend to exert downward pressure on marginal costs. If agents re-
ceive news that TFP will rise in the future, forward-looking price-setters may as a result
drop prices upon receipt of news if the expected drop in marginal costs in the future when
the shock hits dominates the rise in marginal costs during the pre-shock boom. Indeed I
4Note that this statement is very model-dependent since it is reliant on the particular structural
mechanism driving the news boom. For example, in some models changes in expectations about the
future may induce mechanisms which endogenously shift marginal costs downwards in the present,
mimicking a supply-type effect.
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show that the simulations of the TFP-driven news boom for the calibration in this paper
yield a fall in inflation during the boom phase, consistent with predictions elsewhere in
the literature using different structural models. In contrast to the TFP episode, in the
credit episode agents expect that when the credit shock hits in the future it will lead to
an increase the demand for capital, but without the supply-effects of the TFP shock that
would otherwise put downward pressure on marginal costs in the future. Agents thus
expect that the future credit shock will lead to a rise in marginal costs in the future,
and as a result of this and the upward pressure on marginal costs in the boom phase,
prices rise in the present. In the bust phases of both, the realization of overaccumulation
of debt and capital leads to a sharp drop in the demand for new capital. Moreover,
since in both cases the expected future path of fundamentals is no longer perturbed from
steady-state, the impact of the drop in demand is similar for both episodes, leading to a
drop in marginal costs and inflation that falls below steady state.
That TFP-driven news booms tend to predict low inflation or deflation when the real
economy and asset prices boom is generally viewed as being consistent with evidence
discussed by Christiano et al. (2008), Beaudry and Portier (2013b), Christiano et al.
(2011) and Jinnai (2013) that in the data inflation tend to be lower during asset price
booms. It would seem then that at least with this feature of the data, boom-busts
associated with non-supply fundamental shocks such as a credit boom-bust would have
the odds stacked against them: changes in expectations about shocks whose primary
effect is to cause an increase in demand for capital and thus associated rise in marginal
costs when the shock hits might be characterized by high inflation during the boom phase
as price settings raise prices in the present to cover high future expected marginal costs
in the futre as well as high marginal costs in the present. I demonstrate however that
inflation remains low during the credit boom. This is driven partly by the presence of
structural features such as capacity utilization which impair the rise in marginal costs,
but also partly by the fact that only a portion of the overall credit boom is driven by
inefficiencies introduced by sticky prices. In particular, in the same model under perfectly
flexible prices, output still booms in response to news of the credit shock. Adding sticky
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prices amplifies the boom by expanding the output gap relative to output under flexible
prices, but this expansion in the output gap represents only a fraction of the overall
variation in output. An implication of this is that from the perspective of the model,
one cannot simply confront the data assuming that all of the cyclical variation in output
in the data is driven purely by variation in the output gap. This result lies in contrast
with results of New Keynesian models where news-booms are driven primarily by the
inefficient response of the sticky price economy interacting with a sub-optimal monetary
policy rule, such that in the illustrations provided in Beaudry and Portier (2013b) and
Beaudry and Portier (2013a). Those models imply that all or most of the variation
in observed output is driven by variation in the output gap itself. As such, from the
perspective of those models, it is appropriate to assume that all of the observed variation
in output is comprised of variation in the output gap. As Beaudry and Portier (2013b)
note, when doing so, these models tend to imply inflation that is too volatile relative to
output. This property also allows the model to offer a different perspective on criticisms
that New Keynesian interpretations of the Great Recession tend to imply overly-volatile
inflation relative to output, since these criticisms typically assume demand-shocks where
much of the observed variation in output is comprised of variation in the output gap
itself.
Can taking an overaccumulation view offer insight on the behaviour of interest and
prices in the last two recessions? In the data we see a very different behaviour of prices
and policy over the technology boom-bust of the late 1990’s and the credit boom-bust
of the 2000’s, both of which involved a massive boom-bust in asset prices. Figure 1
shows that cyclically adjusted inflation was low during both the boom and bust of the
late 1990’s, consistent with the predictions of the “technology” boom-bust provided by
this model, but that inflation was above-trend yet low during the credit boom of the
mid-2000’s, and then below trend at the start of the recession in 2009, both of which
are consistent with the “credit boom-bust” predictions of the model. Thus despite the
different path of prices and policy between these two boom-busts, the general notion
of “overaccumulation” can account for them when we expand the set of fundamentals
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Figure 1: Interest and prices over three recessions (U.S.).
driving changes in expectations beyond TFP.
Given the relation between expectations and marginal costs in the model, it is then
important to understand how changing the stance of monetary policy impacts the nature
of the boom-bust. Since shocks to TFP put downward pressure on inflation in this
economy, a more vigilant central bank focused solely on inflation-targeting will lower the
policy rate in order to stimulate inflation when TFP increases, with the consequence of
amplifying the demand for new capital. In contrast, the inflationary impact of the credit
shock implies that stricter inflation-targeting will suppress the demand for capital as the
central banks leans against the effect of a fall in default costs. Thus looking forward from
the boom pre-shock phase, in the TFP case agents anticipate that the bank’s actions will
amplify the boom, whereas in the credit case they anticipate the bank will suppress it.
Through simulation I show that consistent with results elsewhere in the literature, stricter
inflation-targeting fails to pull the economy toward the flexible price equilibrium during
the boom phase of the TFP boom-bust, whereas stricter inflation targeting pushes the
economy closer to the flexible-price response during the boom-phase of the credit boom-
bust. In both cases however, conditional on realization of overaccumulation, inflation-
targeting pulls the economy towards the flexible price equilibrium, since this phase is
driven primarly by negative demand-like effect of the drop in demand for new capital.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section I present the
model economy and then in Section 3 I discuss the parameterization. In Section 4 I
discuss the behaviour of marginal costs and inflation implied by models of news, and
then show the model implications through simulation for the technology boom-bust and
TFP boom-bust. Following this I then perform various experiments where I vary the
baseline policy rule to illustrate the impact of policy on the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model economy is a standard New Keynesian framework with variable capital and a
financial accelerator mechanism of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In addition,
the borrowing and lending arrangement includes a stochastic process as in Gunn and
Johri (2013a) that serves as the sources of credit news in the model credit boom-busts.
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households, a single final goods
firm that nonetheless acts competitively, a continuum of monopolistically competitive
intermediate goods firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], with each jth firm producing a differenti-
ated good, one each of a capital-producer and financial intermediary who all nonetheless
act competitively, and as well as a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. Households own goods-producers and capital-producer as well as the finan-
cial intermediary. The intermediate goods firms produce output with labor and capital
services, paying wages to households and renting capital services from entrepreneurs. En-
trepreneurs purchase capital from the capital producer, financing their capital with their
own wealth as well as from loans from the financial intermediary. The entrepreneurs’
capital returns are subject to idiosyncratic shocks observable to the entrepreneurs but
not the financial intermediary, and thus the lending arrangement between the financial
intermediary and a given entrepreneur involves agency costs. The financial intermedi-
ary finances its loans to entrepreneurs by issuing risk-free securities to households. The
capital-producer creates new capital by purchasing output from the goods market and
combining it with existing capital. Nominal elements of the model enter in a cashless
9
manner as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Nominal price rigidities are based
on a Calvo pricing mechanism, but nominal wages are fully-flexible. Monetary policy
consists of a Taylor-form nominal interest rate rule.
The model economy includes markets for final and intermediate goods, labour, house-
hold deposits (financial securities), nominal bonds, intermediated loans, capital services,
and capital goods.
2.1 Household
A typical household has preferences defined over sequences of consumption Ct and hours-
worked Nt with expected lifetime utility defined as
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt), (1)
where β is the household’s subjective discount factor and the period utility function
U(Ct, Nt) follows the class of preferences described in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988),
and where for notational simplicity I abstract from indexing individual household vari-
ables.
The household enters into each period with real financial securities At and nominal
bonds Bnt , earning risk-free gross real rate of return R
a
t and risk-free gross nominal rate
of return Rnt respectively, receiving nominal wage Wt for supplying hours Nt to the
goods-producing firms, and receiving a share of real profits from the capital-producers,
goods-producers and financial intermediary, denoted collectively as Ft. At the end of the
period, the household chooses its consumption Ct and its holdings of financial securities
At+1 to deposit with the financial intermediary.
The household’s period t budget constraint is given by
Ct + At+1 +
Bnt+1
Pt
= RatAt +R
n
t
Bnt
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
Nt + Ft, (2)
where Pt is the price of goods in terms of the nominal unit under the control of the
10
central bank.
The household’s problem is to choose sequences of Ct, Nt, At+1 and B
n
t+1 to maximize
(1) subject to (2).
2.2 Final goods firm
The final goods firm produces the final good Yt by combining intermediate goods yjt, j ∈
[0, 1] according to the technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
yνj dj
) 1
ν
, (3)
where ν ∈ (0, 1] determines the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods.
The producer acquires each jth intermediate good at price Pjt, and sells the final good into
the final goods market at price Pt where it may be used as a consumption or investment
good. Each period the producer chooses its demand for each intermediate good yjt by
maximizing its profits given by
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pjtyjtdj. (4)
The resulting optimality condition then yields a demand function for the ith good as
yjt =
[
Pjt
Pt
] 1
ν−1
Yt. (5)
2.3 Intermediate goods firms
Intermediate good yjt is produced by an imperfect competitor according to the technology
technology
yjt = ztn˜
α
jtk˜
1−α
jt , (6)
where zt is total factor productivity, n˜jt is total hours-worked, and k˜jt is physical capital
services. Hours-worked is a composite of both household and entrepreneurial labor, such
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that
n˜jt = n
Ω
jt(n
e
jt)
1−Ω, (7)
where household labor njt is acquired at wage-rate wt and entrepreneurial labor n
e
jt is
acquired at wage-rate wet . Capital services k˜jt is rented from entrepreneurs in capital
services markets at the rental rate rt, and is defined by k˜jt = ujtkit, where kjt is the stock
of physical capital and ujt is the utilization rate of that stock, chosen by the entrepreneurs.
The firm sells its output into the goods market at price Pjt.
Intermediate goods firms face Calvo frictions in setting their prices such that each
period a fraction ζp of firms cannot re-optimize their price. A firm that is not able to re-
optimize in period t its price in a given period continues to sell its output for Pjt = Pjt−1.
A firm that can re-optimize its price in period t chooses its price P ∗jt to solve
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspβ
sλt+s
λt
[
P ∗jtyjt+s − Pt+sS(yjt+s)
]
, (8)
given the production technology (6) and the demand curve (5), and where S(yjt) is the
firm’s real cost function as a solution to its cost-minimization problem for a given level of
output yjt. The pricing problem results in the standard price-setting condition whereby
the forward-looking price-setters adjust prices in the present to reflected expected future
marginal costs to account for the future contingencies where they will not have the
opportunity to re-optimize their price.
2.4 Financial Intermediary
At the end of each period t the financial intermediary makes a portfolio of loans to the
measure of entrepreneurs, with Bit+1 denoting the loan to the ith entrepreneur, funding
this portfolio of loans by issuing securities, At+1, to the household that promise a risk-
free gross return, Rat+1. The financial intermediary has no other sources of funds, and
thus it must generate a total return on its loan portfolio in each aggregate contingency
to just cover its opportunity cost of funds on the household securities. As in Bernanke
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et al. (1999), each risk-neutral entrepreneur bears all the aggregate risk on its loan and
thus makes state-contingent loan payments that ensure that in each aggregate state of the
world the financial intermediary achieves an expected return equal to its opportunity cost
of funds. This leaves the intermediary with only the idiosyncratic risk associated with
individual loans, which it can diversify away by virtue of holding a large loan portfolio.
2.5 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital and as well they make the ca-
pacity utilization decisions for their capital as in Christiano et al. (2003). Relative to
Gunn and Johri (2013a), the entrepreneurial framework is the same with the exception
of modifications necessary to incorporate the capacity utilization. The timing of the
decisions of the ith entrepreneur is as follows. The entrepreneur enters into period t
with predetermined capital stock Kit, purchased at the end of the previous period from
capital producers for price qt−1, as well as debt obligations Bit. After observing the ag-
gregate state in period t, the entrepreneur chooses the capital utilization rate uit and
then rents capital services K˜it = uitKit at rental rate rt to intermediate goods firms. The
entrepreneur then sells its entire capital stock to capital-goods producers for price q¯t,
realizing its ex-post return to that capital, Rkit, given by
Rkit = ωit
[
uitrt − a(uit) + q¯t
qt−1
]
. (9)
In the above expression, ωi is a random variable providing an idiosyncratic component
to entrepreneur i’s return, such that the ex-ante return to capital is subject to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The random variable ω is i.i.d across firms and time, has
cumulative distribution function F (ω), and is normalized so that Eω = 1. Note that the
entrepreneur observes this idiosyncratic component when realizing its return, but after
making its capacity utilization decision. As in Christiano et al. (2003), entrepreneurs
incur a cost a(uit) per unit of capital in terms of goods for utilization rate uit, where
a′(·), a′′(·) > 0, such that changing utilization influences the enterpreneur’s return to
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capital as in (9).
After realizing its return, the entrepreneur makes any necessary payments to the
financial intermediary to fulfill the terms of its contract with financial intermediaries
determined the previous period.
Finally at the end of the period, the entrepreneur chooses its desired level of capital,
Kit+1, to hold into the following period, buying it from the capital producer for price qt.
Entrepreneurs finance these capital purchases with their own end-of-period net-worth,
Xit+1, and new loans from the financial intermediary Bit+1, such that their financing
satisfies
qtKit+1 = Xit+1 +Bit+1. (10)
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), to prevent entrepreneurs from self-financing and elim-
inating the need for external finance in the long run, the entrepreneur faces a constant
probability, γ, of surviving into the next period. When entrepreneurs die they consume
their entrepreneurial equity, ceit. Finally, entrepreneurs supply a unit time endowment
inelastically to the good-producers at wage-rate wet .
2.6 Agency problem and debt-contract
The agency problem and debt contract follows that of Bernanke et al. (1999), with
modifications described in detail in Gunn and Johri (2013a) to account for a stochastic
element. I describe the main elements here briefly and leave the details to the appendix.5
As indicated earlier, a given entrepreneur finances its desired level of capital to hold into
next period partly with its own net-worth and partly with external financing from the
financial intermediary. In describing the following contract for this external financing, I
take the entrepreneur’s desired choice of capital Kit+1 as given, leaving discussion of the
entrepreneur’s capital utilization decision for the following section.
The financial intermediary can observe the average return to capital Rkt but not
an entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic component ωit, unless it pays a monitoring cost. As a
5Also see Gunn and Johri (2013a) for additional details.
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consequence the parties can adopt a financial contract that minimizes the expected agency
costs, in the form of risky-debt where the monitoring costs are incurred only in states
where an entrepreneur fails to make promised debt payments. We can thus interpret
this monitoring cost as a “default cost”. As in Bernanke et al. (1999) these default costs
take the form of a fraction, θt, of the entrepreneur’s gross payout, ωitR
k
t qt−1Kit, however,
unlike Bernanke et al. (1999), here θt is time-varying and follows a stochastic process,
common to all entrepreneurs, and observable by all agents in the economy.
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur chooses its capital expenditures, qtKit+1 and
associated level of borrowing, Bit+1, with knowledge of neither the aggregate state in
period t + 1 nor the idiosyncratic realization of ω in period t + 1, ωit+1. Conditional
on these choices, the terms of the contract between the financial intermediary and the
entrepreneur specify a contractual non-default state-contingent gross interest rate, Rlit+1
that ensures that in each aggregate state of the world, the financial intermediary achieves
an expected return equal to the its opportunity cost of funds. In the event that the
entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic returns are insufficient to cover its contracted debt payments,
the entrepreneur defaults and goes bankrupt, handing over all remaining gross returns
to the financial intermediary, leaving the gross returns less default costs to the financial
intermediary. Note that given the state-contingent contract structure, the loan rate Rlt(i)
will adjust in period t to reflect the ex-post realization of the aggregate state in t.
I show in the appendix that such a contract results in the condition
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1 = Rat+1 (qtKit+1 −Xit+1) , (11)
where ω¯it+1 is a “cut-off” level of ωit, defined by,
ω¯it+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 = R
l
it+1Bit+1, (12)
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where Γ(ω¯) is the financial intermediary’s expected share of gross returns, given by
Γ(ω¯it) = [1− F (ω¯it)]ω¯it +
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), (13)
and G(ω¯) is given by
G(ω¯it) =
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω). (14)
The above condition (11) defines a menu of contracts for a given level of net-worth
Xit+1 relating the entrepreneur’s choice of Kit+1 to the cut-off level of ω¯it+1.
2.7 Entrepreneur’s problem
In this section I describe the entrepreneur’s capital utilization, capital stock and cut-off
decisions.
2.7.1 Capacity utilization decision
The ith entrepreneur’s gross return in period t, after realization of the aggregate state
but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is given by
V kit =
∫ ∞
ω¯it
ωRkt qt−1KitdF (ω)−RlitBit
=
∫ ∞
ω¯it
ω
[
uitrt − a(uit) + q¯t
qt−1
]
qt−1KitdF (ω)−RlitBit. (15)
Noting that with the exception of uit, since all entrepreneurial-indexed variables are
predetermined at the timing juncture of the utilization decision, we can simply represent
the risk-neutral entrepreneur’s choice of capacity utilization uit as the solution to the
problem
maxuituitrt − a(uit), (16)
yielding the first-order condition
rt = a
′(uit). (17)
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2.7.2 Capital stock and cut-off decision
The entrepreneur’s expected gross return, conditional on the ex-post realization of the
aggregate state but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is given by
V kit+1 =
∫ ∞
ω¯it+1
ωRkt+1qtKit+1dF (ω)−Rlit+1Bit+1, (18)
which simplifies as
V kit+1 = [1− Γ(ω¯it+1]Rkt+1qtKit+1, (19)
where 1− Γ(ω¯it+1) is the entrepreneur’s expected share of gross returns.
For a given level of net-worth Xit+1, the risk-neutral entrepreneur’s optimal capital
and loan cut-off is then
maxKit+1,ω¯it+1Et{V kit+1}, (20)
subject to the condition that the financial intermediary’s expected return on the contract
equal its opportunity cost of its borrowing, equation (11). Letting λit+1 be the ex-post
value of the Lagrange multiplier conditional on realization of the aggregate state, the
first-order conditions are then
Γ′(ω¯it+1)− λt+1 [Γ′(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G′(ω¯it+1)] = 0 (21)
Et
{
[1− Γ(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
+ λt+1
(
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
− 1
)}
= 0 (22)
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkit+1qtKit+1 −Rat+1 (qtKit+1 −Xit+1) = 0, (23)
where (21) and (23) hold in each contingency, but (22) holds only in expectation.
For constant θ as in Bernanke et al. (1999), the above equations collapse into Bernanke
et al. (1999)’s well-known result that the external finance premium R
k
R
is proportional to
the leverage of the entrepreneur. Introducing the time-varying cost of default θt as in the
conditions above then effectively introduces a dynamic wedge into this static relation. For
example, given a fall in θ, the cost of default is now less, implying that a lending contract
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Figure 2: Optimal contract: leverage (L) & cut-off (ω¯) vs. default cost (θ) holding the
external finance premium (R
k
R
) constant.
can now accommodate a higher level of leverage for a given external finance premium.
In effect, changes in θ shift the menu of contracts that describe the combinations of
cut-off and leverage consistent with the terms of the contract. Figure 2 shows the effect
of varying θ on both the cut-off and leverage consistent with the contract for a given
external finance premium Rk/Ra. Note that a fall in θ permits a higher level of leverage
to satisfy the contract.
From the perspective of this paper, what is important from the above discussion is that
a fall in the cost of default θ causes a rise in the demand for new capital by entrepreneurs
for a given risk-free rate, since given the entrepreneur’s current net-worth, higher leverage
allows a higher level of capital to fulfill contract conditions. Importantly, this rise in the
demand for new capital occurs without any shift in the economy production possibilities
frontier as would occur with a positive TFP shock zt. Instead, in this New Keynesian
framework, this increase in demand for investment must be met with either a reduction
in consumption demand, and/or an increase in the supply of goods due to shifts in labour
supply, labour demand and increased capacity utilization.
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2.8 Capital-producer
The competitive capital-goods producer operates a within-period technology that com-
bines existing capital with new goods to create new installed capital. At the end of each
period it purchases existing capital Kkt from entrepreneurs at price q¯t, combining it with
investment It purchased from the goods market to yield new capital stock K
nk
t , which
it sells back to entrepreneurs in the same period at price qt. The capital-producer faces
adjustment costs in the creation of new capital, and incurs depreciation in the process,
so that
Knkt = (1− δ)Kkt + Φ(
It
Kkt
)Kkt . (24)
The capital-goods producer chooses Knkt , K
k
t and It to maximize profits Π
k
t = qtK
nk
t −
q¯tK
k
t − It, leading to the first-order conditions
qt =
1
Φ′( It
Kkt
)
(25)
q¯t = qt
[
(1− δ) + Φ( It
Kkt
)
]
− It
Kt
. (26)
2.9 Stochastic process θt
Both TFP zt and default costs θt follow stationary stochastic processes that include news
shocks as imperfect signals about future innovations. I model the respective news shocks
using a simple stylized formulation similar to that of Christiano et al. (2008), whereby
agents receive news about the innovation p periods in advance. The news shocks are
imperfect since in addition to the news signals, there is also an unanticipated shock for
each process such that the innovation in any given period is the sum of an unanticipated
and anticipated component. As such the stochastic process zt and θ evolve respectively
as
ln θt = ρθ ln θt−1 + θt−p + ε
θ
t , (27)
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and
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + zt−p + ε
z
t , (28)
where ρθ, ρz < 1, 
θ
t−p and 
z
t−p are news shocks that agents receive in period t− p about
the innovation in t, and εθt and ε
z
t are unanticipated shocks. All shocks are mean zero
and uncorrelated over time and with each other. Each shock has standard deviation σi,
where i = {ρ, z, ερ, εz}.
Using these formulations, we can then think about scenarios where the unanticipated
signals partially or fully offset the anticipated signals. For illustrative purposes it is
helpful to consider the extreme fully unrealized case where the unanticipated shock in a
given period fully offsets the anticipated shock such that the summation of the innovations
is zero, given by εθt = −θt−p and εzt = −zt−p. In what follows, I refer to these cases as the
“credit boom-bust” and “technology boom-bust” respectively. It should be clear however
that the analysis of the paper extends more generally beyond the full-offset case to cases
where there is partial offset, such that an overaccumulation bust would correspond to a
situation where the realization of some shock falls short of its expected realization.
2.10 Monetary policy
Monetary policy takes the form of a monetary authority that sets the gross nominal
interest rate Rnt+1 according to a rule in the form
Rnt+1
Rn
=
(
Rnt
Rn
)ρR [(Πt
Π
)φpi ( Yt
Y ∗t
)φy]1−ρR
, (29)
where variables without subscripts are steady-state values, Πt is the gross inflation rate,
and Yt
Y ∗t
is the output gap, where Y ∗t is the flexible price level of output.
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3 Solution and parameterization
The model equilibrium is given in the appendix. I solve the resulting non-linear system
by taking a linear approximation around the steady state. The model calibration for
the real side of the economy is based on that of Gunn and Johri (2013a), where the
parameters related to the financial accelerator are in turn based on those in Bernanke et
al. (1999). As such I discuss the parameterization of the real side only briefly and refer
to Gunn and Johri (2013a) for more detail. The parameterization for the nominal side
of the economy is based on standard values used in the New Keynesian literature which
I will discuss below.
Beginning with the parameters common to standard real-business cycle models, I set
the household’s subjective discount factor β to 0.99, the share of labor in intermedi-
ate goods production α = .67, depreciation of physical capital δ to 0.025, steady state
utilization to uss = 1, and the elasticity of marginal utilization u = 0.25.
To promote comovement, I use preferences of the form used by King and Rebelo
(2000) where the stand-in representative agent has the preference specification
u(Ct, Nt) =
1
1− σ
{
C1−σt υ
∗(Nt)1−σ − 1
}
, (30)
where υ∗(Nt) =
[(
Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
1 +
(
1− Nt
H
)
υ
1−σ
σ
2
] σ
1−σ
, where H is the fixed shift length, and
υ1 and υ2 are constants representing the leisure component of utility of the underlying
employed group (who work H hours) and unemployed group (who work zero hours)
respectively. For σ > 1 these preferences are not separable in consumption and leisure. I
set the fraction of the population working on average, fw to 0.6, the average household’s
share of time allocated to market work Nss to 0.3, and σ = 2 as in Gunn and Johri
(2013a).
The parameters associated with the financial contract and the entrepreneur follow
Bernanke et al. (1999), such that in steady state, the external finance spread Rk−RA =
0.005, leverage, K/X, is approximately 2, and the fraction of entrepreneurs defaulting
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each quarter is 0.076. The quarterly survival rate of entrepreneurs to 0.9795, the variance
of log ω¯ to 0.0727, and steady-state fraction of gross returns lost in default, θ, to 0.115.
I set the persistence of the stochastic process for TFP ρz = 0.99, and following the
estimate in Gunn and Johri (2013c), the persistence of the stochastic process for default
costs ρθ = 0.9722. In all news-based simulations I consider a news shock providing
information about the innovation in period 8, corresponding to p = 8.
For the parameters specific to the New Keynesian features of the model, I set the
steady-state markup to 1.1, the Calvo probability of no price adjustment to ζp = 0.75,
and as well assume a zero-inflation steady state. For the baseline monetary policy rule
I set ρR = 0 and φpi = 0 so that monetary policy consists of a simple pure inflation-
targeting rule with no policy persistence. In the experiments I then consider the impact
of varying these parameters.
In the foregoing simulation experiments I compare the response of the model economy
to both technology and credit shocks, and thus it is helpful to set the relative size of the
shocks so that news about each respective process produces a response of the same
magnitude along some measure. Since my focus on overaccumulation emphasizes the
role of physical capital, I do so by normalizing the size of the technology news shock to
news about a 1% increase in TFP in period 8, and then setting the size of the credit
news shock to the magnitude that produces the same accumulation of physical capital
K in period 8 in the credit episode as in the technology episode. This parameterization
corresponds to a news about a 14.2% fall in default costs in period 8 for the baseline
calibration.
4 Examining the nominal response to boom-busts
I now use the linearized and parameterized version of the model economy to analyze the
nominal response of the economy to the technology boom-bust and credit boom-bust. I
begin by considering the case of the technology episode, first providing some additional
background and a framework for understanding the nominal response to news before con-
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sidering the model simulations. I then move on to considering the credit episode, which I
begin by illustrating the response under flexible prices to both news and contemporane-
ous technology shocks to aid in the understanding of the mechanism, before moving on
to adding sticky prices. Following these exercises, I compare the technology and credit
episodes and then perform various experiments that vary the baseline parameterization.
4.1 Fluctuations in TFP z
In this section I consider the nominal response to expected shocks to TFP, first providing
a background link to the existing literature and a framework for understanding inflation
before moving on to the model simulations.
4.1.1 Background and framework for news
The news shock literature has studied the real response to news shocks about TFP
extensively, and a handful of papers such as Christiano et al. (2008), Christiano et al.
(2011), Barsky and Sims (2009) and Jinnai (2013) study the nominal effects of such a
shock. While empirically there is some debate about whether consumption, investment
and hours-worked all rise in response to a news shock about TFP such as suggested in
the original identification of Beaudry and Portier (2006), the literature is less divided
on the response of inflation: both Beaudry et al. (2011) and Barsky et al. (2014) find
evidence that inflation is weak or falls in response to such a shock, and Christiano et al.
(2008) and Christiano et al. (2011) cite unconditional evidence that inflation tends to be
weak during stock market booms6.
The news-shock literature has used various different structural variations of DSGE
models to study the response of prices and monetary policy to changes in expectations
about TFP, such as Christiano et al. (2008), Christiano et al. (2011), Barsky and Sims
(2009) and Jinnai (2013). Even when there is a diversity of predictions between these
6See Beaudry et al. (2011) for recent non-structural evidence in support of a co-moving real boom
in response to news about a rise in TFP, and Barsky et al. (2014) for recent non-structural evidence
against it.
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structural models about the co-movement of real aggregates, the predictions about in-
flation do not necessarily diverge. For example, both Jinnai (2013) and Christiano et
al. (2011) present structural models where inflation falls below steady state during TFP
news booms, yet in the former consumption initially rises along with a fall in investment
and hours, while in the latter all three of these variables boom.
As discussed in Christiano et al. (2011), Barsky et al. (2014) and Christiano et al.
(2010), one can understand the response of inflation to news in a simple New Keynesian
framework with sticky prices through the linearized expression for aggregate inflation,
which in the context of the present model, is given as
pit = βEtpit+1 + κpmct, (31)
where κp =
(1−ζ)(1−βζ)
ζ
. Solving this forward yields
pit = κp
∞∑
k=0
βkEtmct+k. (32)
To the extent that the expected rise in future TFP will lower expected future marginal
costs, holding other effects constant, forward-looking price-setters in the present will
lower prices, and inflation will fall in the present. Yet since the TFP shock occurs in
some future period, the direct impact of TFP on marginal costs will only occur in the
future when the TFP shock hits (and possibly beyond that if the shock is persistent);
during the initial phase that precedes the boom, there is no change in TFP and hence
marginal costs will be driven by the endogenous response of the model economy. To see
this clearly, consider a news shock received in period t about a rise in TFP in period
t+ p. We can then describe the relative contributions of inflation over the pre and post
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TFP-shock phases as
pit(Ω
+
t ,Kt,Zt, θt) =κp
p−1∑
k=0
βkEtmct+k(Ω
+
t+k,K+t+k,Zt+k, θt+p) + ...
...+ κp
∞∑
k=p
βkEtmct+k(Ωt+k,K+t+k,Z+t+k, θt+p), (33)
where the first and second summations represent the pre-shock and shock phases respec-
tively, and where Ωt is an exogenous state representing the agents’ information-set (or
signals), and Kt is a vector of endogenous state variables. The notation Ω+t represents
an information set augmented with a (positive) news shock received in period t, and K+t
represents the change in the endogenous state variable in response to the news shock.
Some authors have referred to this pre-shock phase as being dominated by demand-like
effects since the economy fluctuates in the absence of the (TFP) shock, and the post-
shock phase as being dominated by supply-like effects, but it should be clear from the
above that this demand-like effect in the pre-shock phase does not necessarily imply that
prices rise initially if the expected supply-like effects of the post-shock phase domintate.
Nevertheless, depending on the particular structural model, marginal costs may rise
enough during the pre-shock phase that the initial summation dominates, such that
inflation rises initially, even if marginal costs fall in the second summation7. Indeed, in
many models in the literature the fall in inflation during the pre-shock phase holds for
certain parameter spaces only, whereas for others it rises.
Additionally, the interaction of the monetary policy rule with the response of forward-
looking pricing setters can significantly impact the character of the boom and introduce
inefficient fluctuations. As discussed in Christiano et al. (2008) and Christiano et al.
(2010), in an environment where an expected rise in future TFP leads to downward
pressure on inflation in the present, an inflation-targeting Taylor-type rule can push the
economy in the opposite direction from the efficient response by lowering interest rates
7For example, Barsky and Sims (2009) present a case where labour supply shifts inward on impact,
driving up the real wage and thus marginal costs to the extent that inflation rises in response to a rise
in expected future TFP.
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in response to the low inflation, stimulating the response of consumption and investment
and amplifying the pre-shock boom. Introducing other distortions such as sticky wages
can amplify the inefficient boom further as in Christiano et al. (2008).
Compared to the study of the behaviour of interest and prices during the pre-shock
boom phase, there has been relatively less emphasis in the literature in studying the
behaviour of these variables after the ex-post phase where the TFP shock turns out not
to be realized. We can represent the ex-post response of marginal cost if the TFP shock
is not realized as
pit+p(Ωt+p,K+t+p,Zt+p, θt+p) = κp
∞∑
k=p
βkEt+pmct+k(Ωt+k,K+t+k,Zt+k, θt+p). (34)
Note that the notation pit+p(Ωt+p,K+t+p,Zt+p, θt+p) implies that after the state of the world
is revealed in period t+ p, if TFP turns out not to have risen, then only the endogenous
state vector K is perturbed related to steady state, with both Ω and Z (and θ) at rest.
Thus from t + p onwards, the economy effectively behaves as if it were at rest and then
suddenly the endogenous state vector K was shocked. If in the boom-bust the pre-shock
boom phase involved positive accumulation of K, then it gives rise to the notion of
“overaccumulation”, and we can effectively think about this phase as a positive shock to
K. Relative to steady state, we have an excess of capital resulting in an impact-effect
of a reduction in demand for new capital and therefore debt, and as well an impact-
effect of an increase in the demand for labour (again relative to steady state) through
the influence of K on labour demand. As such we end up with an initial combination
of demand and supply-like effects as the state vector is shocked and subsequently the
economy adjusts along the transition path, and a possibly ambiguous response of overall
demand for goods. Assuming that the demand effect dominates (as it does in standard
parameterizations of a real business cycle model), relative to steady-state under sticky
prices we would expect inflation to be below steady state as firms increase markups
to meet the low demand for goods. How the magnitude of this below steady state
inflation compares to the level of inflation during the pre-shock boom phase however
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depends very much on the particular model. In any case, as the the above discussion
should make clear, under a TFP driven boom-bust, we shouldn’t necessarily expect the
behaviour of inflation during the bust due to overaccumulation to be the reverse of the
behaviour of inflation/deflation during the pre-shock boom. During the pre-shock phase,
inflation will driven both by both a demand-like phase and expected future supply-like
phase, whereas in the unfulfilled phase, it will be driven by demand effects with some
overlapping contemporaneous supply-like effects.
4.1.2 Model simulations of TFP news
The present model provides a nice illustration of the above discussion. Figure 3 shows
the response of the model economy to news that TFP will rise by 1% in period 8. The
broken line shows the path of the model economy when in period 8 TFP rises as expected,
and the solid line shows the path of the model economy when in period 8 TFP fails to
change as expected, remaining at steady state.
Note that the broken and solid line follow the same trajectory in the pre-shock phase
since the dynamics during this phase are driven purely by the change in expectations.
In response to the news shock, stock prices rise immediately and credit-spreads fall, and
consumption, investment and hours-worked all rise. On the nominal side, both inflation
and the nominal interest rate fall during the pre-shock phase.
The critical elements for understanding why this sticky price economy booms in re-
sponse to news whereas the underlying flexible price economy contracts are the interaction
of the inflation-targeting monetary policy rule with the financial accelerator under sticky
prices. Note that in period 8 when the TFP shock hits, the demand for investment rises
due to the impact of the shock on the marginal product of capital, and the impact of the
shock drives down marginal costs. We can see this in the figure when in period 8 when
the TFP shock hits, the broken line for the markup associated with the realization of the
rise in TFP rises, meaning that marginal costs fall when the TFP shock hits. In response
to the expected fall in future marginal costs, we expected price-setters in period 8 to
lower prices, putting downward pressure on inflation in period 8. From the perspective
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Figure 3: Expected rise in TFP under sticky prices. Response to news about 1%
increase in TFP in period 8: TFP realized in period 8 (dashed line); TFP not realized
in period 8 (solid line).
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of period 8, faced with deflation, the inflation-targeting central bank lowers the policy
rate, putting downward pressure on the risk-free rate and enhancing the overall boom.
In the presence of adjustment costs, asset prices then rise in period 8 also as a result of
the high investment.
How does this translate into a boom in period 1? From the perspective of period 1,
asset prices rise today based on the expectation of the rise in asset prices in period 8.
This sets off a chain of events that loosens credit conditions in period 1 since the rise in
asset prices increases net worth of entrepreneurs, drives down contractual credit spreads,
increasing the level of leverage consistent with the contract and as a result increasing
the demand for new capital in the initial period. Under sticky prices, firms unable to
change prices in period 1 meet this increase in demand by increasing production and
decreasing the average markup. While the marginal costs fall in period 8 during the
shock phase, it is clear form the figure that they rise during the demand-like pre-shock
phase. Nevertheless the contribution of the persistent rise in marginal costs in the shock
phase dominates and inflations falls initially as forward-looking price setters in period 1
lower prices. As a result, the central bank keeps the policy rate low during the initlal
boom, further enhancing the boom. These effects combined with the wealth effect of the
rise in future TFP on consumption allows a co-moving boom in response to news about a
rise in future TFP. Note that the adjustment costs on capital here are a critical element;
in their absence, there is no increase in assets prices to set off the financial accelerator
effect, and no initial boom. The role of the inflation-targeting central bank is also critical
in lowering the risk-free rate when the shock hits in period 8 to catalyze the boom8. This
mechanism through which an expected change in fundamentals in the future impacts
credit conditions today is reminiscent of other models in the literature such as Jermann
and Quadrini (2007), Walentin (2009) and Gortz and Tsoukalas (2012).
One thing to be clear about in this figure is that in response to news about TFP, the
boom is completely inefficient, and entirely an artifact of the interaction of the sticky
8It is not necessary however that the central bank lower the policy rate in period 1 to achieve a boom
in period 1.
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price aspects of the model with the financial accelerator framework and monetary policy
rule. This is not necessarily a feature of the booms in the other models mentioned in
the literature above. For example, in the model of Christiano et al. (2008), the efficient
response of the flexible price RBC model underlying the NK model is for the primary
aggregate quantities to boom in response to an expected rise in future TFP. In that
model, adding sticky prices amplifies the boom in an inefficient matter through the
the frictions of sticky prices, and adding sticky wages amplifies the boom considerably
through inefficiencies in the labour market. In contrast, the response of the underlying
flexible price model in this model economy to a rise in expected future TFP is much
like that of the standard RBC model: consumption rises, yet investment, hours-worked
and output fall. Yet adding sticky prices and an inflation targeting monetary policy
rule reverses the direction of investment and hours, producing a boom in all primary
quantities in response to news about TFP9.
Now focusing on the case of unfulfilled expectations, the path of the solid line depicts
the case where in period 8 the agents find out that TFP does not rise as expected.
Forward-looking firms able to adjust prices now face a lower path of expected future
marginal costs higher than previously expected under expectations of the TFP shock,
which all else equal results in an immediate upward revision of expected future marginal
costs, and thus an upward revision in inflation expectations. Note in the figure that while
in period 8 there is a sharp rise in inflation, it is still below steady state. Faced with
an overaccumulation of capital, the demand for new capital falls, resulting in a textbook
negative demand shock whereby firms unable to reduces prices lower production, raising
markups. As such, despite the upward revision of marginal costs due the absence of any
increase in TFP, marginal costs and thus inflation still remain below steady state during
the bust. Faced with low inflation, the inflation-targeting central bank as a result lowers
the policy rate. Thus overall under the TFP-driven boom bust, we see below steady state
inflation during both the pre-shock boom phase as well as the unfulfilled bust phase.
9One could readily add additional structural features to the present model such that under flexible
prices all primary quantities boom as in Christiano et al. (2008), but doing so would unnecessarily
complicate the model and obfuscate some of the mechanisms that I will describe later.
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4.2 Fluctuations in default costs θ
I now consider the response of the model economy to variation in the cost of default θ.
To clearly understand the impact of changes in θ, I first consider a contemporaneous and
expected change in θ in the model economy with flexible prices.
4.2.1 A contemporaneous and expected fall in θ under flexible prices
Figure 4 shows the response of the flexible priced version of the model economy to a
surprise contemporaneous 14.2% fall in θ, and as well the realized and unrealized cases
of news about an expected 14.2% fall in θ in period 8. Since with flexible prices the
response of the real side of the economy is essentially the same as in the real economy of
Gunn and Johri (2013a), I discuss them only briefly.
Beginning with the contemporaneous shock, note that the surprise fall in θ causes
an immediate boom in consumption, investment, hours-worked and output, along with
a rise in asset prices and fall in the credit spread. While the initial fall in θ in period
1 has a small impact effect through the bank’s zero profit condition that increases the
entrepreneurs net-worth slightly in period 1, the most significant effect occurs through
the impact of the persistent fall in θ in the financial contract: each entrepreneur’s choice
of capital in period 1 depends on state state of the economy in period t + 1. Since the
shock to θt is persistent, θt+1 will also be low, shifting out the menu of financial contracts
available such that the entrepreneurs can increase their leverage for a given external
finance premium, meaning that entrepreneurs can choose a higher level of new capital
and still satisfy the contract terms. Thus the fall in θ ultimately leads to an increase in
demand for investment.
How does this fall in the demand for new capital transmit into the overall economy?
Since the shock to θ has no direct impact on the production function and the shock as
a result does nothing to loosen the economy’s resource constraint, in this flexible price
economy the marginal utility of consumption λt and real interest rate must rise such that
the rise in investment is funded by intertemporal substitution of consumption and leisure
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Figure 4: Contemporaneous versus expected fall in default costs θ under flex-
ible prices . Response to contemporaneous 14.2% fall in θ (dotted line); Response to
news about 14.2% fall in period 8 - θ realized in period 8 (broken line), θ not realized in
period 8 (solid line).
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by the household. Indeed under separable preferences (not shown), consumption falls
while investment, hours and output rise. Consumption is not fully crowded out however
since the rise in λt means that labour supply shifts out as the household substitutes leisure
form the present into the future, driving up equilibrium hours-worked, capacity utilization
and therefore output in equilibrium. Only under the non-separable preferences does
consumption rise also since the marginal utilization of consumption is increasing in hours-
worked, allowing a rise in consumption to be consistent with a high marginal utilization
of consumption. Moreover the rise in consumption alongside the rise in investment is
made possible by the additional output induced by the outward shift in labour supply
and resulting rise in equilibrium hours-worked.
Now turning to news about future changes in θ, the thick line in the figure which
shows the response of the model economy to news that θ will rise in period 8. The key
to understanding this effect is to consider that from the perspective of period 1 when the
news is received, agents now expect that in period 8 the impact effect of the economy in
period 8 of the shock to θ in that period 8 will be as described for the contemporaneous
shock above in period 1. To be specific, in period 1, agents expect that in period 7 (when
entrepreneurs first choose new capital under a contract that reflects the expected fall in θ
the following period) there will be an increase in demand for new capital, along with a high
marginal utility of consumption and high risk-free rate in period 7. The forward-looking
effect of the household’s Euler equation then implies that the future rise in the marginal
utility of consumption induces a rise in the marginal utilization of consumption in the
present, unleashing the intertemporal substitution effects in the present similar to those
in the contemporaneous case, whereby the outward shift in labour supply from the rise
in λ droves up equilibrium hours-worked, utilization and output, while still permitting a
rise in consumption in the present.
Note that the effect here lies in direct contrast to the case of news about a rise
in TFP. When TFP hits in the future, its effect of loosening the economy’s resource
constraint results in a low marginal utilization of consumption in the future, resulting in
a lower marginal utilization of consumption in the present also, and thus an intertemoral
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wealth effect that under flexible prices induces the household to raise consumption and
lower hours-worked in the present, resulting in a contraction. The literature as a result
has spent considerable effort introducing structural mechanisms to break or weaken this
wealth effect on leisure. The case of news about the fall in θ does not suffer this same
challenge, since the effect of a fall in θ in the future is to drive the marginal utilization
of consumption upwards rather than downwards. As a result, in contrast to TFP boom-
busts, for the credit boom-bust under flexible prices the economy exhibits procyclical
co-movement with relatively few structural modifications relative to a standard DSGE
model.
Now focusing on the case of unfulfilled expectations, the path of the solid line depicts
the case where in period 8 the agents learn that default costs θ will not fall as they had
previously expected. Entrepreneurs now suddenly find themselves with too much capital
given the state of the world, and as a result the demand for new capital plummets.
This drop in the demand for capital drives down the risk-free rate, setting in a chain of
events which now contracts labour supply and reduces capicity utilization, reducing the
equilibrium level of output and investment and consumption.
Turning to the nominal side of the model economy for both the surprise and antici-
pated cases in the figure, note that under flexible prices, the nominal side of the linearized
model economy effectively consists of a Fisher equation and the simple monetary rule,
given respectively as
rft = r
n
t − Etpit+1 (35)
rnt = φpipit, (36)
where the interest rates and inflation are expressed as (absolute) deviations from steady
state. These two equations can be combined to form a single expectational difference
equation in pit with the real rate r
f
t as a forcing variable, being determined completely by
the real economy, which solving the equation forward gives current inflation as function
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of expected future real rates
pit =
∞∑
k=0
(1/φpi)
k rft+k. (37)
Note that the parameter φpi represents the stance of monetary policy in determining the
price level here, such that looser inflation targeting represented by a lower φpi results in
a higher rate of price growth.
Figure 4 shows that inflation rises immediately to its peak in period 1 under the
surprise shock, whereas under the anticipated shock, inflation rises initially and then
continues to climb until reaching its peak in period 7. Consistent with the above discus-
sion, the path of inflation in both of these cases is driven by the realized and expected
path of the real-rate: in the former, the real rate rises to its peak in period 1, whereas in
the latter the real rate rises and then continues to climb to its peak in period 7. Given the
monetary rule that simply leans against inflation, the path of the nominal policy rate in
both these cases thus follows that of the respective inflation rates. Under the anticipated
case, if in period 8 default costs θ turn out not too fall, note that the sudden drop in the
current and expectured future real rates now drives inflation below steady state.
Note that in both of the scenarios, the rise in inflation is low: less than 80 basis points
on an annualized basis relative to an approximately 1.5% expansion of output. Recent
literature such as Beaudry and Portier (2013b) has suggested that New Keynesian models
might suggest a volatility of inflation relative to the output gap that is larger that seen
in the data. With regard to this critique, I make two points relative to the results of
this model thus far. First, in sticky-price frameworks, the literature such as Christiano
et al. (2005) has discussed the role of capacity utilization on keeping a lid on inflation in
response to demand-shocks through its impact in limiting the rise in marginal costs. Even
here under flexible prices capacity utilization plays an important role in maintaining low
inflation over the real boom through its effect of limiting the rise of the risk-free rate.
Indeed, removing the effect of utilization in the above exercise (not shown) reduces the
size of the boom in output by more than half, yet nearly doubles the rise in the risk-free
rate and the inflation rate.
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Secondly, on a more subtle note, and a point that is particularly important to assessing
the nominal impact of news shocks, the observations of Beaudry and Portier (2013b)
pertain to the relation between inflation and the output gap. As Uribe (2013) discusses,
the output gap (or the natural level of ouput) is a model-specific notion. Using an
empirical measure of the output gap such as the deviation of output from a smooth
trend or HP-filtered variations as in Beaudry and Portier (2013b) may be inconsistent
with a given model if the model implies variation in the flexible price level of output in
response to a given shock10. As we will see when we add sticky prices, only part of the
credit boom in this model is made up of movement in the output gap; a large fraction
of the boom still consists of the rise in the natural level of output to news driven by the
rise in the real rate of return. Thus even if a given New Keynesian model such as this
one implies a high volatility of inflation relative to the output gap per-se in response to
the demand-driven boom phase of a news shock, this does not necessarily mean that it
implies a high volatility of inflation to output : any inflationary movements driven by a
rise in the output gap will contribute only partly to the overall relation between inflation
and output overall, the other contribution between the rise in the flexible price level of
output in response to the same shock. This is particularly important when empirically-
derived estimates of the output gap are not model specific, but rather, use a measure
such as deviation of output from a smooth trend. Taking the output of the above exercise
under flexible prices as artificial data, using such a measure of the output gap would then
imply an empirical relation between inflation and the output gap, even though the model
specific output gap is zero, as shown in the figure.
As this discussion highlights, it is important to understand the relative contribution
of the flexible and non-flexible components of output variation of a news-driven boom in
a given model economy. Models that rely more in inefficiencies of nominal rigidities and
10I stress the may in this statement. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2013b) motivate their
approach by considering the response of a labour-only NK model to news about future TFP. In that
particular example, in the absence of capital, under flexible prices output does not fluctuate at all in
response to news about future TFP since once can show that consumption is proportional to current
TFP, which doesn’t change until the future. As a result, any boom associated with introducing sticky
prices in that example is completely a result of movements in the output gap, and thus consistent with
BP’s empirical measure of the output gap as the HP-filtered variation in output.
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a suboptimal rule to generate a boom in response to a news shock (as in the early case of
TFP-news in this paper) will have a large contribution of the output gap to the overall
boom in output, and thus imply a structural relation between inflation and output that
is influenced more by the impact of the countercyclical markups than in an alternative
model where the underlying flexible economy booms in response to the news shock.
4.2.2 An expected fall in θ under sticky prices
What is clear from above discussion is that under flexible prices, the rise in demand
for new capital is dependent on intertemporal substitution to induce the initial boom,
and the intertemporal substitution in turn drives the behaviour of the nominal side
of the economy through the dependence of the inflation rate on current and expected
real rates. Adding nominal rigidities breaks this simple dependency by introducing the
countercyclical markup channel through which supply can rise to meet the increase in
demand for capital. Moreover, the additional of sticky prices and the monetary policy
rule interact to yield predictions for interest and prices distinct from those under the
TFP case.
Figure 5 shows the response of the model economy to news that default costs θ will
fall by 14.2 % in period 8. The broken line shows the path of the model economy when
in period 8 θ falls as expected, and the solid line shows the path of the model economy
when in period 8 θ fails to change as expected, remaining at steady state. As in the
case of flexible prices, consumption, investment hours and output all boom in advance
of the fall in default costs, stock prices rise and the credit spread falls. Now under
sticky prices however, the output gap rises and amplifies the boom in output at its peak
by approximately 50% relative to the the same shock under flexible prices. Despite
the larger boom, the risk-free rate rf peaks at just above 10 basis points now, more
than a third less than the rise under flexible prices. Clearly then under sticky prices,
countercyclical markups add another channel beyond that of intertemporal substitution
through which the supply of output can rise to meet the rise in demand for new capital
induced by the expected fall in default costs. In particular, in period 7 when the demand
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Figure 5: Expected fall in default costs under sticky prices. Response to news
about 14.2% fall in default costs θ in period 8: θ realized in period 8 (dashed line); θ
not realized in period 8 (solid line).
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for capital rises due to the expected fall in default costs the following period, under sticky
prices demand-driven firms unable to adjust their prices meet this increase in demand for
given levels of the risk-free rate demand with additional supply of output, in the process
lowering the average aggregate markup. In effect this fall in the markup shifts labour
demand outwards, permitting an increase in aggregate hours-worked and thus output.
Additionally, as under flexible prices, the increase in demand for investment in period 7
also drives up the risk-free rate in that period, shifting out labour supply in period 7 and
driving up the marginal utilization of consumption.
To understand the mechanism causing the boom in period 1 in response to news
relative to that under flexible prices, note that from the perspective of period 1, agents
anticipate the above elements in period 7, and as in the flexible price economy, the
forward-looking nature of the household’s Euler equation raises the marginal utilization
of consumption today. Yet since under sticky prices the expected rise in the future real
rate is less, the rise in the marginal utilization of consumption is muted considerably in
period 1, and as a result intertemporal substitution plays a smaller role in triggering the
initial boom than under flexible prices. Instead, under sticky prices and with adjustment
costs to capital, the financial accelerator now plays a key role in the initial boom: stock
prices rise today, partially based on the expectation that they will rise in the future due
to high future investment, driving up entrepreneurs’ net-worth in period 1 and thereby
loosening credit conditions such that the credit spread falls, resulting in an increase in
demand for new capital in period 1. This additional investment demand in period 1
is then met with an increase in supply by firms through the countercylcical markup
channel11. Note that this impact of the financial accelerator is much more muted in the
flexible price economy than in this case with flexible prices, since under flexible prices,
any additional investment demand driven by the rise in stock prices in period 1 would
have to be funded by a rise in the risk-free rate, thereby chocking off some some of that
11Under sticky prices, removing adjustment costs and utilization in the sticky-price economy removes
much of the initial rise in investment, and hours etc. in period 1, such that these variables rise slightly
in the initial period in response to news, continuing to climb until their peak in period 7. This lies in
contrast to the case under flexible prices where the real economy still booms initially in the absence of
adjustment costs.
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demand. Finally, note that now under sticky prices, the same structural mechanism - the
feedback effect of asset prices in the financial accelerator that loosens credit conditions in
the present - is playing a key role in enabling the initial booms in both the TFP episode
and this credit episode.
Consistent with the above discussion, from the figure we can see that the markup now
moves countercyclically during the pre-shock boom phase as firms meet the increase in
demand, implying that marginal costs are above steady steady during the initial boom,
reflecting the demand-like effect of the news shock as the average markup falls. Note
that from the perspective of the pre-shock phase, agents’ expectations about the path of
marginal costs in the post-shock phased are captured by the negative of the path of the
markup associated with the broken line in the figure from period 8 onwards. Unlike in
the case of TFP, agents now expect marginal costs to be higher after the shock hits also.
Using the earlier notation, we can represent the pre-shock marginal costs as
pit(Ω
+
t ,Kt,Zt, θt) =κp
p−1∑
k=0
βkEtmct+k(Ω
+
t+k,K+t+k,Zt+k, θt+p) + ...
...+ κp
∞∑
k=p
βkEtmct+k(Ωt+k,K+t+k,Zt+k, θ+t+p)., (38)
and where in contrast to the similar expression for TFP, both the first and second sum-
mation now involving demand-like effects that drive up the marginal costs and therefore
prices, where the κ+ in the first summation again represents the accumulation of en-
dogenous stocks such as capital and debt in response to the expected change in θ in the
future. Thus both the pre-shock boom-phase and expected shock phase involve actual
and expected increases in marginal costs. Yet despite this and a boom in output that
is 50% larger compared to that under flexible prices, inflation rises only to about 70
basis points annualized, slightly less than the rise in inflation under flexible prices. The
nominal interest rate then follows the path of inflation, rising during the pre-shock boom
as the central bank leans against the boom.
Now turning to the case of unfulfilled expectations, the path of the solid line depicts
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the case where in period 8 the agents find out that default costs did not indeed fall as
expected. Faced with a capital stock that is not too high given the state of the world,
the demand for capital plummets, and output drops through the impact of both the
markup and real rate channels on the supply of goods. Considering again the expression
for marginal costs, the ex-post response of marginal cost if the θ shock is not realized is
given by
pit+p(Ωt+p,K+t+p,Zt+p, θt+p) = κp
∞∑
k=p
βkEt+pmct+k(Ωt+k,K+t+k,Zt+k, θt+p). (39)
From the perspective of period 8, forward-looking firms able to adjust prices now see
a lower path of expected future marginal costs than before, lowering prices, driving up
the average markup and reducing output. Faced with deflation, the central bank drives
down the policy rate immediately, partial tempering the drop off in demand. Overall,
in contrast to the behaviour of inflation during the TFP boom-bust, under the credit
boom-bust we see low but above-trend inflation during the pre-shock boom phase, and
below-trend inflation during the unfulfilled bust phase.
4.3 Two boom-busts
To compare the credit boom-bust with the TFP boom-bust, Figure 6 shows the path of
the respective news shocks followed by no realization of those shocks for both episodes.
Note that the response of the model economy is very similar for all real quantities and
relative prices, and indeed the trajectory of capital shown in the last panel is nearly
identical. In both cases, since there are no exogenous shocks to fundamentals during the
pre-shock phases, the behaviour of the economy in the pre-shock phase in both cases is
driven by endogenous general equilibrium dynamics centered around the accumulation of
debt and capital. Similarly, in period 8 when agents learn that the respective shocks will
not occur, there is again no exogenous shock to fundamentals, and thus the behaviour of
the economy in the unfulfilled bust phase in both cases is driven by endogenous general
equilibrium dynamics centered around the de-accumulation of debt and capital.
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Figure 6: TFP boom-bust versus credit boom-bust. Response to news about 1%
increase in TFP in period 8, TFP not realized in period 8 (thin line); Response to news
about 14.2% fall in default costs θ in period 8, θ not realized in period 8 (thick line).
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While there are many similarities between the two boom-busts on the real side of the
economy, the figure shows considerable differences on the nominal side. To illuminate
this further, note that the expression for marginal costs for the unfulfilled credit boom-
bust (39) is the same expression for the unfulfilled shock in the TFP news case, (34). As
in that case, from the perspective of period t + p, the economy and thus marginal costs
only differ from the steady-state by the change in the endogenous state variables in the
model, and thus conditional upon agents learning that the shock did not materialize as
expected, we can think of this phase as a shock to the endogenous state vector of the
system. In the absence of inertia in the monetary policy rule, and for simplicity neglecting
the effect of any predetermined prices, we can basically think of this as a positive shock
to debt and capital. As such, for a given accumulation of physical capital in period 8,
the TFP and credit over-accumulation busts will only differ to the extent that the run
up in debt differs between these two cases. Yet the simulations show that the run-up
in debt is very similar. In particular, in period 8, in both cases the run up in debt is a
bit over twice that of capital. As such, we can approximate the behaviour of both busts,
conditional on the shock being unrealized in period 8, as positive shock to debt that is
about twice that of capital. Figure 7 shows this experiment, with a surprise shock to the
debt-capital state vector of (1.87%, 0.91%), equivalent to the value of the debt and capital
state vector for the TFP episode, and very close to that for the credit episdoe. Note that
the path of all variables is very similar to the path of the variables in each of the two
respective cases from period 8 onwards, conditional on the shock not being realized, and
as this experiment makes clear, despite the differences between the run-ups, the busts
due to overaccumulation in both cases are very similar. In particular, both cases have the
interpretation of a negative demand shock (as well some confounding effects on labour
demand on account of the elevated stock of capital), and as a result in both cases there
will be downward-pressure on prices. In the credit boom-bust, this downward pressure
on prices will follow a pre-shock boom-period with slight upward pressure on prices, and
thus in the credit boom-bust we see a transition from upwards to downwards pressure
on prices, and thus a fall in inflation below steady-state in the recession. In contrast,
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in the TFP boom-bust, this downward pressure on prices will follow a pre-shock boom
with falling prices, and this in the TFP-boom bust we see a transition from more to less
downward pressure on prices.
4.3.1 Impact of stance of inflation-targeting
Thus far I have analyzed the model economy using a simple pure-inflation targeting
policy rule. I now consider the impact of varying this model rule.
Figures 8 and 9 show the impact of introducing persistence into the policy rule for the
TFP and credit boom-bust respectively. Note that in the TFP case, as the persistence of
the policy rate increases and as a result the monetary authority becomes less responsive
in an given period, the size of the boom diminishes. To understand this, recall that in
period 8 when the shock hits, the bank lowers the rate in response to the fall in inflation
due to the fall in marginal costs, amplifying the boom. With the bank more sluggish
and less responsive, this amplification is reduced. This is our first suggestion that under
TFP news, a more active monetary authority actually amplifies the boom, increasing
inefficiencies and pushing the economy away from the flexible price equilibrium. In
contrast, for the case of the credit boom-bust, the size of the boom increases as the
monetary authority becomes less responsive though an expansion of the output gap.
Interestingly however, this does not come at the cost of higher inflation in the present.
In fact, inflation is lower in the pre-shock period the more sluggish is the central bank,
since with more policy persistence, inflation expectations fall, which when combined with
a less responsive current policy rate exerts downward pressure on the risk-free rate. We
can see this effect clearly in the figure where as policy persistence increases, the real
interest rate decreases rather than increases in the initial period. On the other hand,
when in period 8 the θ shock turns out not to be realized, the size of the bust is also
amplified, with output now falling significantly below steady-state during the bust, since
now the real interest rate rises heading into the recession, choking of investment further.
Note also that in the credit case, since the pre-shock period involves a rise in the policy
rate to hold off inflation, in the transition to the recession, the persistent policy rate
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Figure 7: A conditional over-accumulation bust. Response to simultaneous surprise
1.87% shock to debt and 0.91% shock to capital.
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continues to retain memory of the previous boom, thus not dropping as rapidly when
investment demand plummets heading into recession, and therefore keeping the real rate
persistently low.
Figure 10 shows the impact of tightening the stance of inflation-targeting in the policy
rule for the TFP and credit boom-bust respectively. Note that for the TFP boom-bust,
stricter inflation targeting reduces the initial size of the output gap, but fails to reduce
it at its peak in period 7 in the period before the expected shock. In contrast, in the
credit boom-bust, stricter inflation targeting reduces both the initial boom-bust as well
as the peak rise in period 7. To understand this result, first consider the TFP episode.
From the perspective of period 8, seeing deflation when the TFP shock hits, the central
bank effectively lowers the real interest rate more. Investment as a result rises more in
that period, reducing the fall in marginal costs and therefore also reducing the extent
of deflation. So now from the perspective of period 1, agents expect marginal costs to
fall less in the future, so the downward pressure on marginal costs in the post-shock
phase provides less of a contribution to the current inflation determination. If the bank
responds enough, the upward pressure on marginal costs in the pre-shock phase eventually
dominates so that inflation rises initially. As a result, the bank now increases the policy
rate initially, raising the real rate and choking off the initial boom. In fact, increasing the
strictness of inflation-targeting can drive the output gap below steady state in period 1.
Note however although stricter inflation targeting chokes off the initial boom in the early
periods, it does not reduce the peak boom in period 7 in the period before the shock is
expected to be high, since investment rises here based on anticipation of the shock effects
in period 8 (though the impact of asset prices), and investment is expected to be high in
period 8 because the central bank is keeping it high by lowering real rate in period 8. In
the credit episode by contrast, from the perspective of period 8, the more vigilant bank
now raises the real more more in period 8. This as a result chokes of investment in period
8, reducing the boom in period 8 in in real quantities and asset prices. With lowering asset
prices in period 8, asset prices rise less in period 1, dampening the financial accelerator
effect and therefore dampensing the initial boom as well. Eventually increasing strictness
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Figure 10: Impact of stance of inflation-targeting under TFP and θ news.
Response to news about shock in period 8, shock not realized in period 8: φpi =
{1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2} (in order of increasing line thickness).
of inflation-targeting enough can drive the output gap below steady state in period 1.
Note that in both the TFP and credit episodes, increasingly strict inflation-targeting
can contain inflation, but overshoot the perfectly-flexible equilibrium such that it drives
the output gap negative in the early periods. Figure 11 repeats the previous exercise of
Figure 10, this time using the policy rule of φy = 0.5, such that the monetary authority
leans against both inflation and the output gap. As the figure shows, for the credit
episode, under this policy stricter inflation targeting now reduces both the output gap
and extent of overshooting more significantly. Indeed this policy rule can effectively
dampens the inefficient sticky-price boom completely (note however that the boom in
the natural level of output remains in accordance with the flexible price response). This
comes at the cost of higher inflation however (not shown in figure). In contrast to the case
of the credit boom-bust, under the TFP boom-bust, stricter inflation-targeting under the
policy rule with φy = 0.5 still fails to reduce the size of the output gap at its peak, since
for this rule, with more weight on inflation than the output gap, the bank still in effect
lowers the real rate in period 8, which raises investment in period 8 etc.
In the above exercises, as we alter the policy rule, we alter both the nature of the
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Figure 11: Impact of stance of inflation-targeting under TFP and θ news, with
φy = 0.5. Response to news about shock in period 8, shock not realized in period 8:
φpi = {1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 2} (in order of increasing line thickness).
pre-shock boom phase as well as the recession, since the former drives the extent of the
accumulation of capital and debt. Since both the TFP and credit boom-busts share many
similarities duringing the pre-shock boom phase in terms of real variables such as the
rapid accumulation of capital, one might ask how the nature of the policy rule following
during a recession due to overaccumulation impacts the economy when the policymaker
is unsure whether the insure whether the overaccumulation was driven by expectations
about TFP or expectations about credit. Note that in both the TFP and credit-boom
busts, upon realization that the shocks were not realized in period 8, the policymaker
simply finds itself in the identical situations of a world where there is too much debt and
capital. Thus while modeling such a scenario both ex-ante and ex-post would necessitate
introducing imperfect observation on behalf of the bank, we can approximate the ex-post
impact of policy, conditional on overaccumulation, by conditioning the state space on
an overaccumulation of debt and capital using the earlier approach of postively shocking
debt and capital. One advantage of this approaches is that it isolates the change in
policy on the response of the overaccumulation itself, effectively removing the effect of
the change in policy on the pre-shock boom, and holding constant the size of the pre-shock
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boom. Figure 12 shows the effect of this exercise under pure inflation-targeting. Note
that stricter inflation targeting reduces the output gap, thereby reducing the depth of
the recession, and as well, stricture inflation-targetin reduces the extent the reduction in
inflation. Since this figure applies both to an overaccumulation due to either a TFP boom-
bust or a crediit boom-bust, these results suggest that conditional on overaccumulation,
stricter inflation-targeting pulls the economy towards the efficient equilibrium in both
the TFP boom-bust and the credit boom-bust.
5 Conclusions
The conventional approach to understanding interest and prices in DSGE models involves
identifying the space of fundamental shocks, and then determining the impact that re-
alizations of these shocks have on the nominal side of the economy under various policy
regimes. Often the basis for understanding the impact of these shocks involves categoriz-
ing them as “supply” or “demand” disturbances. As I have showed in this paper, allowing
for imperfect anticipation in the shock space complicates this analysis. Not only does
allowing for anticipated components to a given stochastic process allow for demand-like
effects during booms due to anticipation, but by virtue of the shocks being imperfect, we
can get realizations of complete boom-bust cycles independent of the actual realizations
themselves. While such an expansion and contraction in the absence of any change in
fundamentals might suggest a demand-driven behaviour both in the boom and the bust,
the behaviour of interest and prices through the cycle may not conform to conventional
ideas about such demand-driven cycles, but rather, be driven by changes in expectations
about future fundamental shocks with either demand or supply-driven properties.
I investigate both a simulated technology boom-bust and a credit boom-bust, and
show that despite near observationally-equivalent time-series behaviour in endogenous
real variables and exogenous fundamentals, the path of interest and prices is very different
on account of the differences in the impact of the changes in expectations about the
future in each respective case. In particular, the boom-phase of the TFP boom-bust is
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Figure 12: Stance of monetary policy conditional over-accumulation bust. Re-
sponse to simultaneous surprise 1.87% shock to debt and 0.91% shock to capital.
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characterized by below-trend inflation or deflation, whereas that of the credit boom-bust
is characterized by slightly above-trend inflation. In contrast, inflation falls below-trend
in the bust phases of both. Additionally, while the model predicts procyclical inflation
over the credit boom-bust, inflation growth remains low during the boom, and is tamed
even further when one allows for persistence in the policy rule. Stricter inflation-targeting
fails to pull the economy toward the efficient equilibrium during the boom phase of
the TFP boom-bust, yet it does so in the boom phase of the credit boom bust. In
both cases, conditional on realization of overaccumulation, inflation-targeting pulls the
economy towards the flexible price equilibrium.
53
References
Barsky, Robert B. and Eric R. Sims, “News Shocks,” NBER Working Papers 15312,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc September 2009.
, Susanto Basu, and Keyoung Lee, “Whither News Shocks?,” in “NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual 2014, Volume 29” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, October 2014.
Beaudry, Paul and Franck Portier, “An exploration into Pigou’s theory of cycles,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, September 2004, 51 (6), 1183–1216.
and , “Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations,” American Economic Re-
view, September 2006, 96 (4), 1293–1307.
and , “News Driven Business Cycles: Insights and Challenges,” NBER Working
Papers 19411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc September 2013.
and , “Understanding Noninflationary Demand-Driven Business Cycles,” in “NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2013, Volume 28” NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc, April 2013, pp. 69–130.
, Deokwoo Nam, and Jian Wang, “Do Mood Swings Drive Business Cycles and is
it Rational?,” NBER Working Papers 17651, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc December 2011.
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, “The financial accelerator
in a quantitative business cycle framework,” in J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, eds.,
Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, April
1999, chapter 21, pp. 1341–1393.
Christiano, Lawrence, Cosmin Ilut, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno,
“Monetary policy and stock market boom-bust cycles,” Working Paper Series, Euro-
pean Central Bank October 2008.
, , , and , “Monetary Policy and Stock Market Booms,” Working Papers 2011-
005, Banco Central de Reserva del Per March 2011.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, “Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political
Economy, February 2005, 113 (1), 1–45.
, Mathias Trabandt, and Karl Walentin, “DSGE Models for Monetary Policy
Analysis,” NBER Working Papers 16074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
June 2010.
, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno, “The Great Depression and the
Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis,” Proceedings, 2003, pp. 1119–1215.
, , and , “Risk Shocks,” American Economic Review, January 2014, 104 (1),
27–65.
54
Dupor, William and M. Saif Mehkari, “The analytics of technology news shocks,”
Technical Report 2013.
Gilchrist, Simon and John V. Leahy, “Monetary policy and asset prices,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, January 2002, 49 (1), 75–97.
Gortz, Christoph and John D Tsoukalas, “News and Financial Intermediation in
Aggregate and Sectoral Fluctuations,” Discussion Papers 12-10, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Birmingham July 2012.
and John D. Tsoukalas, “Learning, Capital Embodied Technology and Aggregate
Fluctuations,” Review of Economic Dynamics, October 2013, 16 (4), 708–723.
Gunn, Christopher M. and Alok Johri, “News and knowledge capital,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, January 2011, 14 (1), 92–101.
and , “An expectations-driven interpretation of the Great Recession,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 2013, 60 (4), 391–407.
and , “Fear of Sovereign Default, Banks, and Expectations-Driven Business Cycles,”
Carleton Economic Papers 13-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics May
2013.
and , “News, Credit Spreads and Default Costs: An expectations-driven interpre-
tation of the recent boom-bust cycle in the U.S,” Technical Report 2013.
Guo, Jang-Ting, Anca-Ioana Sirbu, and Mark Weder, “News about Aggregate
Demand and the Business Cycle,” School of Economics Working Papers 2012-01, Uni-
versity of Adelaide, School of Economics January 2012.
Jaimovich, Nir and Sergio Rebelo, “Can News about the Future Drive the Business
Cycle?,” American Economic Review, September 2009, 99 (4), 1097–1118.
Jermann, Urban J. and Vincenzo Quadrini, “Stock market boom and the pro-
ductivity gains of the 1990s,” Journal of Monetary Economics, March 2007, 54 (2),
413–432.
Jinnai, Ryo, “News shocks and inflation,” Economics Letters, 2013, 119 (2), 176–179.
King, Robert G. and Sergio T. Rebelo, “Resuscitating Real Business Cycles,”
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc February 2000.
, Charles I. Plosser, and Sergio T. Rebelo, “Production, growth and business
cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1988, 21
(2-3), 195–232.
Leeper, Eric M., Alexander W. Richter, and Todd B. Walker, “Quantitative
Effects of Fiscal Foresight,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, May 2012,
4 (2), 115–44.
Levin, Andrew T., Fabio M. Natalucci, and Egon Zakrajsek, “The magnitude
and cyclical behavior of financial market frictions,” Technical Report 2004.
55
Uribe, Martin, “Comment on ‘Understanding Noninflationary Demand Driven Busi-
ness Cycles’,” in “NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2013, Volume 28” NBER Chapters,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, April 2013, pp. 144–153.
Walentin, Karl, “Expectation Driven Business Cycles with Limited Enforcement,”
Working Paper Series 229, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) April 2009.
Zeev, Nadav Ben and Hashmat U. Khan, “Investment-Specific News Shocks and
U.S. Business Cycles,” Carleton Economic Papers 12-05, Carleton University, Depart-
ment of Economics September 2012.
56
Appendix
5.1 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital. At the beginning of each period,
entrepreneurs rent their capital Kit to the goods-producer at rental rate rt. At the end
of the period, they sell their existing capital to the capital-producer at price q¯t, and
then immediately buy back, at price qt, their desired level of capital, Kit+1, to hold into
next period. Entrepreneurs finance these capital purchases with their own end-of-period
net-worth, Xit+1, and new loans from the financial intermediary Bit+1, such that their
financing satisfies
qtKit+1 = Xit+1 +Bit+1. (40)
Entrepreneur i’s return to capital is subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk,
such that its ex-post return to holding capital from t to t+ 1 is given by
Rkit+1 = ωit+1R
k
t+1 (41)
where ωi is a random variable providing an idiosyncratic component to entrepreneur i’s
return, and where
Rkt+1 =
rt+1 + q¯t+1
qt
. (42)
is the ex-post return on capital averaged across all entrepreneurs. The market prices rt,
q¯t and qt and thus R
k
t+1 are functions of the aggregate state of the economy. The random
variable ω is i.i.d across firms and time, has cumulative distribution function F (ω), and
is normalized so that Eω = 1.
To prevent entrepreneurs from self-financing and eliminating the need for external
finance in the long run, we assume as in Bernanke et al. (1999) that each entrepreneur
faces a constant probability, γ, of surviving into the next period. When entrepreneurs
die (and at no other time), they consume their entrepreneurial equity, cet (i).
Finally, entrepreneurs supply a unit time endowment inelastically to the good-producers
at wage-rate wet .
5.2 Agency problem and debt-contract
The discussion in the main text regarding the financial intermediary implies that in each
aggregate state in period t, the financial intermediary’s budget constraint is
ξt = R
a
tAt, (43)
where ξt is the intermediary’s return on its entire loan portfolio after idiosyncratic un-
certainty has been realized, and where Rat and At are predetermined.
In the financial contract, the cut-off value ω¯it defined as
ω¯it+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 = R
l
t+1Bit+1. (44)
If the entrepreneur’s realization exceeds the threshold such that ωt+1(i) ≥ ω¯t+1(i), the
entrepreneur pays the financial intermediary the contracted amount Rlit+1Bit+1, keeping
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the amount ωit+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 − Rlit+1Bit+1. If ωit+1 < ω¯it+1, the entrepreneur defaults,
receives nothing, and the financial intermediary receives (1 − θt)ωit+1Rkt+1qtKit+1. As
with Rlit, ω¯it adjusts to reflect the aggregate ex-post realizations of the aggregate state
in period t.
Given these contract details, we can write the financial intermediary’s expected return
on a given loan contract in a given aggregate contingency in period t+ 1 as
ξit+1 = [1− F (ω¯it+1)]Rlit+1Bit+1 + (1− θt+1)
∫ ω¯it+1
0
ωRkt+1qtKit+1dF (ω) (45)
Substituting in (44), we can write (45) in terms of the cut-off ω¯ as
ξ(ω¯it+1, θt+1) =
[
[1− F (ω¯it+1)]ω¯it+1 + (1− θt+1)
∫ ω¯it+1
0
ωdF (ω)
]
Rkt+1qtKit+1. (46)
Defining the financial intermediary’s expected share of gross returns Γ(ω¯) as
Γ(ω¯it) = [1− F (ω¯it)]ω¯it +
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), (47)
and defining G(ω¯) as
G(ω¯it) =
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), (48)
we can re-write the financial intermediary’s expected return on a given loan contract in
a given aggregate contingency as
ξt+1(ω¯it+1, θt+1) = [Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1 (49)
where the terms in square brackets represent the financial intermediary’s share of profits
net of default costs. The requirement that the financial intermediary earn an expected
return in every aggregate contingency equal to its opportunity cost of funds,
ξt+1(ω¯it+1, θt+1) = Rt+1Bit+1 (50)
then serves as a restriction to define a menu of contracts over loan quantity and cut-off
value for the entrepreneur. Substituting in (40) and (49) we can then write this as
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKt+1(i) = Rat+1 (qnt Kit+1 −Xit+1) (51)
which for a given level of net-worth Xit+1 defines a menu of contracts relating the en-
trepreneur’s choice of Kit+1 to the cut-off ω¯it+1.
5.3 Entrepreneur’s contract problem
The entrepreneur’s expected gross return, conditional on the ex-post realization of the
aggregate state but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is given by
V kit+1 =
∫ ∞
ω¯it+1
ωRkt+1qtKit+1dF (ω)−Rlit+1Bit+1. (52)
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Substituting in the definitions above yields
V kit+1 = [1− Γ(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1, (53)
where 1− Γ(ω¯it+1) is the entrepreneur’s expected share of gross returns.
For a given level of net-worth Xit+1, the entrepreneur’s optimal contacting problem
is then
maxKit+1,ω¯it+1Et{V kit+1} (54)
subject to the condition that the financial intermediary’s expected return on the contract
equal its opportunity cost of its borrowing, equation (11). Letting λit+1 be the ex-post
value of the Lagrange multiplier conditional on realization of the aggregate state, the
first-order conditions are then
Γ′(ω¯it+1)− λt+1 [Γ′(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G′(ω¯it+1)] = 0 (55)
Et
{
[1− Γ(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
+ λt+1
(
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
− 1
)}
= 0 (56)
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkit+1qtKit+1 −Rat+1 (qnt Kit+1 −Xit+1) = 0 (57)
where (55) and (57) hold in each contingency, but (56) holds only in expectation.
5.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this economy is defined by contingent sequences of Ct, c
e
t (i)∀i, Nt, njt∀j,
ujt∀j, nejt∀j, Pjt∀j, yjt∀j, It, At+1, Kit+1∀i, uit∀i, Bit+1∀i, ω¯it+1∀i, Knkt , Kkt , Bnt+1 ,wt,
wet , rt, R
a
t+1, R
l
it+1∀i, Rkt , q¯t, qt, Rnt , Pt, that satisfy the following conditions: (i) the
allocations solve the household’s, final goods-producer’s, intermediate goods producers’,
financial intermediary’s, entrepreneurs’ and capital producer’s problems, taking prices
as given, (ii) all markets clear, (iii) the resource constraint Ct + C
e
t + q
n
t Φ(
It
Kt
Kt) +
θtG(ω¯t)q
n
t−1R
k
tKt = Yt holds, where
∫ 1
0
Kit+1 = Kt+1,
∫ 1
0
Bit+1 = Bt+1,
∫ 1
0
Xit+1 = Xt+1,∫ 1
0
ceit+1 = C
e
t+1,
∫ 1
0
N ei = N
e = 1 and where all entrepreneurs choose the same cut-off
such that ω¯it+1 = ω¯t+1 ∀i, and therefore Rlit+1 = Rlt+1 ∀i.
Equilibrium in the capital goods market implies that Knkt = Kt+1 and K
k
t = Kt, and
equilibrium in the securities market implies that At = Bt. Nominal bonds are in zero
net-supply such that Bnt = 0.
In equilibrium the financial intermediary’s return on its entire loan portfolio just
covers its opportunity cost of funds, implying that its budget constraint holds in every
aggregate contingency and after idiosyncratic uncertainty is resolved as
[Γ(ω¯t+1)− θt+1G(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1qtKt+1 = Rat+1At+1. (58)
Aggregate net-worth evolves as the accumulated gross returns of surviving entrepreneurs
plus their labor income. Letting Vt be aggregate gross entrepreneurial returns, we can
compute it as the average gross idiosyncratic returns,
Vt = [1− Γ(ω¯t)]Rkt qnt−1Kt, (59)
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which after making substitutions yields
Vt = R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt −
[
RatBt + θtG(ω¯t)R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt
]
, (60)
so that aggregate net-worth evolves as
Xt+1 = γVt + w
e
t . (61)
Finally, entrepreneurial consumption Cet is equal to the aggregated gross return of dying
entrepreneurs,
Cet = (1− γ)Vt. (62)
For reference later in the discussion of our results, we also define the equilibrium real
risk-free net interest rate as rft =
1
Etβ
λ1t+1
λ1t
− 1, the credit spread as Rlt−Rat , and leverage
as Lt =
qnt Kt+1
Xt+1
.
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